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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CPLR 5201(b): A debt secured by an artisan's lien is property subject
to enforcement, but lien itself is not.
CPLR 5201(b) provides that a money judgment may be enforced
against any non-exempt 27 property which is assignable or transferrable.
Such property may constitute a present or a future interest, and may
be unvested. 12 While this seems to include a debt owed to the judg-
ment debtor, a logical incorporation of CPLR 5201(a) would limit
enforcement to a debt presently due or "to become due, certainly or
upon demand."'129
In United States Extrusions Corp. v. Strahs Aluminum Corp.,130
the petitioner sought a determination as to its rights to certain scrap
metal in the possession of Davran Industries, Inc.131 The petitioner
had delivered aluminum extrusions to Davran for fabrication with the
understanding that the finished products and any leftover metal were
to be returned to it upon completion of the work. While completed
units were sent to the petitioner, the leftover metal remained with
Davran which, by operation of law, had an artisan's lien thereon for
its unpaid charges. 13 2 Subsequently, Davran's creditors levied on all
the property on Davran's premises, including the scrap metal. At issue
was the extent to which the scrap metal was subject to execution by
Davran's creditors.
The Supreme Court, Nassau County, held that only the claim for
money due to Davran (clearly property within the meaning of CPLR
5201), and not the leftover metal, could be sold by the sheriff. In so
127 Certain properties are specifically made exempt for enforcement purposes. See
CPLR 5205 and 5206.
128 See generally 6 WK&M 5201.07-.09.
129 CPLR 5201(a). See also 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 5201, commentary at 24-25 (1963); 6
WK&M 5201.07.
180 71 Misc. 2d 1016, 337 N.Y.S2d 780 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
181 The petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5239, which gives any
interested person the right to institute a special proceeding against a judgment creditor to
determine rights to property "[p]rior to the application of property or debt by a sheriff or
receiver to the satisfaction of a judgment ...."
;132 Davran had a lien on the scrap metal for its reasonable charges for the work done
and was entitled to its possession until paid. N.Y. LnN LAw § 180 (McKinney 1966). Even
though certain fabricated units were returned to the petitioner, "the lien attaches to the
retained property, to the full extent of work done on the entire order, including the
portion returned." 71 Misc. 2d at 1018, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 781-82. See also Blumenberg Press
v. Mutual Mercantile Agency, 177 N.Y. 362, 69 N.E. 641 (1904); Hare's Motors, Inc. v.
Roeder Mfg. Co., 207 App. Div. 670, 202 N.YS. 830 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 238 N.Y. 590, 144
N.E. 904 (1924) (per curiam).
An artisan's lien is waived if the work is done on open credit. 71 Misc. 2d at 1018, 337
N.Y.S.2d at 782, citing In re Tele King Corp., 137 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). In the
instant case, however, the court found no credit agreement.
"A lien against personal property ... if in the legal possession of the lienor, may be
satisfied by the sale of such property .. " N.Y. LtEN LAw § 200 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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holding, the court noted that a lien represents an integral part of the
lienor's interest even though a lien is not property within the meaning
of CPLR 5201(b).18 On the sale of the debt by the sheriff, the pur-
chaser is therefore entitled to possession of the scrap metal with the
right to sell it if the petitioner fails to satisfy the debt.1u
CPLR 5222: Restraining notice is not cancelled by ex parte stay of
execution.
A CPLR 5222 restraining notice allows a judgment creditor
to prevent his debtor or a third party from disposing of the debtor's
assets before execution.13 5 A third party who disposes of a judgment
debtor's assets in violation of a restraining notice is subject to contempt
sanctions and liable to the creditor for damages. 38 Third parties, there-
fore, should not assume that a restraining notice has ceased to be
effective. This point was illustrated in Nardone v. Long Island Trust
C0.
1 87
In Nardone, a judgment creditor served a restraining notice on a
bank pursuant to CPLR 5222. The judgment debtor moved to open
the default judgment and obtained an ex parte order staying execution.
The bank informally received a copy of this order and permitted the
debtor to write checks against his account. When the sheriff attempted
to execute the judgment, the account was overdrawn. The creditor
sued the bank for damages for violating the restraining notice. Unani-
mously reversing a judgment for the respondent and granting the
petitioner's motion for summary judgment, the Appellate Division,
133 71 Misc. 2d at 1018, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 782, citing Merritt v. Bartholick, 36 N.Y. 44
(1867); Beak v. Waits, 266 App. Div. 900, 42 N.Y.S.2d 652 (4th Dep't 1943) (mem.).
There is support, however, for the proposition that a lien itself is property.
[A] lien is property in the broad sense of that word, and although it has no
physical existence it exists by operation of law so effectively as to have pecuniary
value, and to be capable of being bought and sold.
Haebler v. Myers, 132 N.Y. 363, 368, 30 N.E. 963, 965 (1892). See also Yarmak v. Perry, 182
Misc. 268, 43 N.Y.S.2d 304 (N.Y. City Ct. N.Y. County 1943).
134 "At any time during this procedure, [the lienee] may redeem its property by
paying to the sheriff the amount of the artisan's lien." 71 Misc. 2d at 1019, 337 N.Y.S.2d at
782-83. By requiring the purchaser to sell the property to satisfy the lien, the lienee is
afforded the protections of article 9 of the Lien Law, including notice of sale and the right
of redemption.
135 See 6 WK&M 5222.01.
136 CPLR 5251 expressly provides for contempt sanctions against violators of CPLR
5222. Without express statutory authority, courts have held that the remedy of damages is
also available. See Mazzuka v. Bank of North America, 53 Misc. 2d 1053, 280 N.Y.S.2d 495
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1967), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN's L.
Rlv. 436, 466 (1968). See also Sumitomo Shoji New York, Inc. v. Chemical Bank New York
Trust Co., 47 Misc. 2d 741, 263 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965), af'ed mem., 25
App. Div. 2d 499, 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1st Dep't 1966) (dictum), discussed in The Biannual
Survey, 40 ST. JonN's L. REv. 303, 348 (1966).
.37 40 App. Div. 2d 697, 336 N.Y.S.2d 325 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
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